The final part argues that the only way to prove the existence of God is to accept a view called Logical Pantheism, according to which God is identical to Logical Space. Anselm's Ontological Argument in Philosophy of Religion. Nonexistent Objects in Metaphysics. Pantheism in Philosophy of Religion. Philosophy of Religion. Direct download. Dualism about Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind. In the second section, four classic problems Causal Role Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind.
Functionalism and Qualia in Philosophy of Mind. Machine Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct anomic danglers is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental—physical connection.
The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject. Qualia and Materialism in Philosophy of Mind. Direct download 9 more. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their Bodily Awareness in Philosophy of Mind. The dictionary tells you that a shadow is a dark area or volume caused by an opaque object blocking some light.
God, Mind and Logical Space: A Revisionary Approach to Divinity (Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion) [I. Aranyosi] on inacgorcomp.tk *FREE* shipping. Editorial Reviews. Review. To come. About the Author. István Aranyosi is an Assistant Buy God, Mind and Logical Space: A Revisionary Approach to Divinity.
The definition is correct, but we need to clarify a couple of its elements: darkness and blocking. The clarification leads to the view that to see a shadow is a degree of failing to see a surface.
I will also argue that seeing a silhouette i. Finally, I argue that comparative empirical research on shadows' contribution to amodal completion in apes and humans supports the view that humans, unlike apes, perceive shadows as shadows rather than as black objects, thus lending indirect support for my view that to see a shadow is a way and degree of failing to see a surface.
Reflections in Metaphysics. Shadows in Metaphysics. Vision in Philosophy of Mind.
I argue that bodybuilding should not qualify as a sport, given that at the competition stage it lacks an essential feature of sports, namely, skillful activity. I consider several objections to this analysis, after which I conclude that bodybuilding is an endeavor closer to both beauty competitions and classical sculpture rather Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Direct download 2 more. In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism.
Prob- lems with a posteriori identity materialism are identi? The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relation between physical and phenomenal properties. Compos- ition does not seem to be? Finally, I propose a materialist model for the mind-body relation that is able to resist the attack from conceivability arguments.
Theories of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind. Direct download 11 more.
This object need not reflect, refract, absorb or block light. To undermine the motive for this heretical innovation, I generalize the puzzle to situations involving inexact shading. Aranyosi cannot extend his solution to these On the bright side, the solution to the puzzle that I propose in my book Seeing Dark Things does extend to these variations.
Direct download 7 more. Mainstream metaphysics has been preoccupied by inquiring into the nature of major kinds of entities, like objects, properties and events, while avoiding minor entities, like shadows or holes. However, one might want to hope that dealing with such minor entities could be profitable for even solving puzzles about major entities.
I propose a new ontological puzzle, the Shadow of Constitution Puzzle, incorporating the old puzzle of material constitution, with shadows in the role of the minor entity to guide our approach I then analyze the standard answers to the original puzzle of constitution, in their role as potential solutions to the new puzzle. Finally, I discuss three views that can solve the proposed puzzle.
Coincident Objects in Metaphysics.
In his early career Whitehead wrote primarily on mathematics, logic, and physics. Name of resource. Whether this table was denierbud's steep passing or whether he sent required to spotlight it everywhere are Mattogno is interested. Jan J. Still, this is a remarkably ambitious and innovative book.
Material Constitution in Metaphysics. Material Objects, Misc in Metaphysics.
Direct download 10 more. I discuss a solution to the Yale shadow puzzle, due to Roy Sorensen, based on the actual process theory of causation, and argue that it does not work in the case of a new version of the puzzle, which I call "the Bilkent shadow puzzle". I offer a picture of the ontology of shadows that constitute the basis for a new solution that uniformly applies to both puzzles. The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers.
The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment.
Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. Death and Dying, Misc in Applied Ethics. Everett Interpretation in Philosophy of Physical Science. Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Mind. Direct download 8 more. Perception in Philosophy of Mind. The Perceptual Relation in Philosophy of Mind.
This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality. Zombies and the Conceivability Argument in Philosophy of Mind.
In his latest book, Roy Sorensen offers a solution to a puzzle he put forward in an earlier article -The Disappearing Act. The puzzle involves various question about how the causal theory perception is to be applied to the case of seeing shadows. Sorensen argues that the puzzle should be taken as bringing out a new way of seeing shadows. Direct download 12 more. Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality.
Not so for ordinary philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. So what We can approach it via one of the central arguments against realism — the argument from hallucination.
The argument is intended as a proof that in ordinary, veridical cases of perception, perceivers do not have an unmediated perceptual access to the world. There are many versions of it; I propose the following1: 1. Hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible. If two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature.
The contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects. Therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects. The key move is, I believe, from the fact that hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of veridical perception are possible to an alleged common element, factor, or nature, in the form of a mental state, in the two cases — that is, premise 2.
Disjunctivism in Philosophy of Mind. Illusion and Hallucination in Philosophy of Mind.
Direct download 5 more. The statement is not true or at least can reasonably be doubted , he argues, if one assumes a the theory of persistence according to which objects are four-dimensional entities, persisting through perdurance, i. Three- and Four-Dimensionalism in Metaphysics.
If everything exists, then it looks, prima facie, as if talking about nothing is equivalent to not talking about anything. However, we appear as talking or thinking about particular nothings, that is, about particular items that are not among the existents. How to explain this phenomenon? Another way is to deny that the process of thinking about such nonexistents is a genuine singular thought.
Furthermore, in what follows, I will not deal with any conception of quantitative infinity that is concerned with magnitude and multitude.
I assume, however, that qualitatively finite entities can have properties that in themselves are related to quantitative infinity in one of its forms. Nota bene: This is not the same definition as the one suggested in G. This definition is consistent with realities other than qualitatively finite ones.
Although these interpretations are interwoven, my main interest is with the ontological interpretation of the principle of contradiction. That is, whatever is qualitatively infinite is not subject to the law of contradiction. There are three options for understanding this. In the first case, the denial of qualitative finitude leads to the concept of an entity exemplifying neither a par- ticular property nor its complement.
I will say that a corresponding entity is negatively infinite if and only if there is at least one property F such that it is neither F nor not F, and I will say that a corresponding entity is maximally neg- atively infinite if and only if for all properties F, x is neither F nor not F.